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its components for Indian banks in 1992-2009. We estimate parametric and non-parametric 
efficiency frontiers, followed by Divisia and Malmquist indexes of Total Factor Productivity 
respectively. To account for technology heterogeneity among ownership types we utilise a 
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productivity growth, driven mainly by technological progress. Furthermore, results indicate 
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position of foreign banks becomes increasingly dominant and their production technology 
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I. Introduction 
 
The past two decades have witnessed deregulatory policy reforms in banking industries 
around the world. These reforms have aimed to increase competition in order to promote 
productive financial systems, which would ultimately foster the development of the real 
economy. Deregulation is usually expected to stimulate productivity growth via the general 
advancement of production technology and the efficiency improvements of individual banks.
1
 
Re-regulation, on the other hand, is often expected to work as a constraint on the activity of 
banks with the aim of long term stability. Empirical evidence to support these aforementioned 
assertions is mixed, with some studies reporting improvements in productivity following 
financial reforms, while others suggest little, no, or even negative productivity growth.
2
 
Differences in empirical findings are likely to arise from: differences in the applied modelling 
techniques utilised; difficulties in disentangling the sources of productivity growth (arising 
from technological progress, scale or efficiency improvements); and complex relationships 
between ownership structure and efficiency and productivity changes.
 3
  
It is against this background that we seek to extend previous research by presenting an 
assessment of the effects of regulatory reforms on productivity growth, its sources, and on the 
relationship between bank performance and ownership types for Indian banks over the period 
1992 to 2009. The Indian case is particularly suited to our research questions since it is a 
representative illustration of a gradualist approach to reform a banking system that was 
characterised by financial repression. The reforms started in 1992 and were guided by two 
Narasimham Committee reports, in 1991 and 1998 respectively. The period 1992-1997 saw 
the introduction of policy instruments aimed at promoting competition (deregulation), 
whereas from 1998 onwards the policy focus shifted towards the long run stability of the 
banking system (prudential re-regulation).
 4
  The whole reform process can thus be divided, at 
 3 
least in theory, in two stages with the year 1997 as the watershed. Moreover, the Indian 
Government introduced a uniform regulatory framework to the different ownership types, 
which gives us an opportunity to investigate the impact of regulatory reform on the 
ownership-performance relationship in a market with a level playing field.
5
  
Methodologically, we utilise two complementary approaches: a non-parametric metafrontier 
sequential Malmquist TFP index and a parametric metafrontier Divisia index. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to perform an analysis of productivity change and its 
components within a metafrontier framework, both in a parametric and non-parametric 
setting. To test whether different approaches lead to similar policy conclusions, both share a 
common framework in terms of dataset, variables definition and behavioural assumptions. 
Having estimated technology gaps between ownership specific frontiers and metafrontier, a 
natural extension is to analyse them more closely and then test for convergence, that is the 
attainment of productivity equality in the long run. We do this by using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 
To anticipate our main results, we find that the reforms have fostered sustained TFP growth, 
driven mainly by technological progress. Results also indicate that state-owned, private and 
foreign banks reacted differently to changes in the operating environment. Specifically, 
regulatory changes generated a very favourable environment for foreign banks, which 
enabled them to use the best available technology in the industry and engage in cost 
technology innovation. On the other hand, the increasing technological gap between the best 
practice and the private and state banks frontiers indicates a lack of significant technological 
spillovers between different types of bank. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data set and the variables used in the construction 
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of the estimable models, while Section 4 presents a detailed exposition of the methodology 
utilised. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and finally Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Literature review 
There is a vast literature investigating bank efficiency, its components and its determinants 
using both parametric and non parametric approaches.
6
 Most studies have measured technical 
and cost efficiency and, to a lesser extent, revenue and profit efficiency and productivity 
change. While early studies investigate mainly the US and EU banking markets, in recent 
years the number of studies focusing on developing countries has increased, mainly due to 
the unprecedented economic reforms implemented in those countries. Indian banking is no 
exception and starting from the mid-1990s the outcomes of the Indian reform process have 
been extensively analysed. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) investigated the productivity growth 
of Indian public sector banks in the pre-reform period (1970 - 1992) and found that 
nationalisation curtailed bank productivity growth. Kumbahakar and Sarkar (2003)'s sample 
included both public sector and private banks in the period 1985-1996 and found that reforms 
did not deliver the expected TFP growth. The empirical literature on developing nations 
generally finds relatively low efficiency of state-owned institutions. In India, though, a 
number of studies, using competing methodologies and different time periods, seem to 
provide convincing evidence of higher average cost (and profit) efficiency of public sector 
banks (Sathye, 2003; Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004; Sensarma, 2006; Das and Ghos, 2006; 
2009; Zhao et al., 2010; Ray and Das, 2010, among others). Das and Ghosh (2006) posit that 
public banks might be more efficient as government ownership may have facilitated 
recapitalisation at the onset of reforms. The literature seems also to agree on the poor 
performance of smaller private banks and on the considerable differences among banks both 
in terms of efficiency and productivity change.  
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The fact that the three ownership types co-exist and, to a certain extent, compete on the 
Indian banking market does not imply that they form a homogenous group. State, private and 
foreign ownership entail different organisational forms and incentive structures, which are 
likely to result in different operational behaviour. At the macro level, Bhaumik et al. (2011) 
find evidence that different ownership types react differently to monetary policy initiatives of 
the Reserve Bank of India. These varying reactions might be driven by differences in the 
structure of their balance sheet, particularly in terms of asset composition (Stein, 1998). 
Theory suggests a number of reasons as to why different types of banks lend to different 
types of firms, mostly based on information asymmetries. For example, Stein (2002) suggests 
that foreign banks may be less able to process "soft" information about local firms and 
therefore may prefer to lend to more "transparent" larger firms. Foreign banks might also 
have a comparative advantage in granting large loans. In contrast, state-owned banks often 
have to lend to "priority sectors" such as small and medium size enterprises, state-owned 
firms and firms in rural areas. Based on Indian data, Berger et al. (2008) find evidence of 
these different lending relationships.  
These significant differences are often overlooked by the existing bank efficiency literature; 
however the importance of properly accounting for heterogeneity has been highlighted in a 
handful of recent studies (Bos and Schmiedel, 2007; Kontolaimou and Tsekouras, 2010). The 
assumption underlying the estimation of efficiency against a common frontier is that all 
banks in the industry are homogenous and utilise the same technology. If this assumption is 
not correct it will result in biased estimators and efficiency measures. Koetter and Poghosyan 
(2009) identify two main types of systematic differences across and within national banking 
markets: the first type of heterogeneity pertains to the environment in which banks operate 
and is exogenous to managers, although it affects their choice of available technology. The 
second type pertains to managerial choices and therefore affects efficiency, that is the ability 
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to attain the optimum benchmark rather than the shape of the efficient frontier. Our study 
builds upon this recent strand of literature by employing the metafrontier approach (Battese et 
al., 2004; O'Donnell et al., 2008) to account for the possibility of technological differences 
among ownership types. 
 
III. Data and variables definition 
A. Data 
The data were collected from the Reserve Bank of India and cover all commercial banks 
(foreign, domestic private and state owned) operating in India from 1992 until 2009.   
With the guide of homogeneity criteria and in line with previous literature, we excluded 
regional rural banks and foreign banks that consistently had less than two branches over the 
entire sample period. In both cases, their lines of business are very different from the nation- 
wide operations of other commercial banks. The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel data 
set of a total of 1230 observations. Table 1 gives a snapshot of the relative weight of the three 
ownership categories and of how the sample relates to the total market (proportion of total 
assets). All data were deflated using the GDP deflator using 1994 as base year. 
 
< Insert Table 1> 
 
B. Variable definition 
To identify the inputs and outputs variables we follow the intermediation approach (Sealey 
and Lindley, 1977) and employ a two-input, three-output specification. The three chosen 
outputs are performing loans (y1), other earning assets (y2) and fee-based income (y3).
7
 The 
revenues with respect to these three outputs are given by interest income on loans, interest 
income on total other earning assets and non-interest income respectively.
 8
 The two chosen 
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inputs are total loanable funds (the sum of deposits and money market funding) and non-
interest operating cost (which includes both the cost of the labour input and of physical 
capital). The price for total loanable funds (w1) is calculated as the ratio of total interest 
expenditure to total loanable funds, and the price for non-interest operating cost (w2) is given 
by the ratio between non-interest operating cost and total assets. The number of branches is 
also introduced separately to proxy for size. Summary statistics for outputs and inputs are 
given in Table 2.   
To account for the macroeconomic environment and prevent bias especially in the estimation 
of technical change we also include the cash reserve ratio (CRR), the statutory liquidity ratio 
(SLR) and a measure of the reliance of the economy upon the banking sector as opposed to 
other sources of finance (Mac). Finally in the econometric specification we also specify a 
dummy variable R to capture the period before and after re-regulation (before and after 
1997).  
<Insert Table 2> 
IV. Methodology  
A. Empirical framework 
The measurement of total factor productivity change (TFP) and its components can be 
performed via the estimation of efficiency frontiers, either using Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which lead respectively to the calculation of a 
Divisia index and of a Malmquist index of TFP change (Malmquist, 1953).
9
 In this paper we 
make a number of methodological contributions to the literature: firstly, we use both 
parametric and non-parametric techniques as they have well known complementary 
properties and consistency in their results strengthens the analysis and is particularly useful 
for regulators and other decision makers (Bauer et al., 1998; Casu et al., 2004). To improve 
comparability, we implement a sequential DEA approach (Tulken and Vanden Eeckaut, 
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1995) which leads to the estimation of a sequential Malmquist TFP index. In addition, unlike 
most of the literature, for the decomposition of the Malmquist index we do not follow Färe et 
al. (1994), since their method, albeit very popular, is actually valid only under the assumption 
of constant returns to scale. We follow instead the method proposed by Ray and Desli (1997), 
which is valid under variable returns to scale and allows the proper separation of scale effects 
from the rest. Finally, we recognise the heterogeneous nature of our data across ownership 
types, and therefore we address this issue in the context of a metafrontier framework (Battese 
et al, 2004; O'Donnell et al, 2008). We then estimate both a non-parametric sequential 
metafrontier Malmquist TFP index and a parametric metafrontier Divisia index to assess 
productivity change.  
 
B. Group-specific frontiers: SFA, DEA and Divisia and Malmquist indexes 
In an input minimization perspective, an efficiency frontier is defined as the minimum level 
of input(s) for a given level of output(s), and the efficiency of a firm can be measured by 
means of a “distance function” D (Shephard 1953, 1970): this is a radial measure of the 
distance of that firm from the frontier such that D = 1 when the firm is fully efficient and D>1 
otherwise. 
Data Envelopment Analysis constructs a piece-wise linear convex frontier from the linear 
combination of the best practices among the observations (Charnes et al., 1978, 1981). In the 
case of i =1…N firms that produce m =1,…., M outputs using j =1…, J inputs at time t and 
with variable returns to scale, the efficiency of each firm is calculated by solving the 
following linear programming problem (once for each firm). 
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t
oo D/1  so that o 1 .  
For the calculation of TFP we follow Ray and Desli (1997) and we define the Malmquist 
index for the k-th ownership between any two times t and t+1 and with variable returns to 
scale as: 
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From (2) we can see that the Malmquist index is calculated as the ratio of distance functions 
and it is given by the product of three components: the change in efficiency (EC), 
technological change (TC), and scale change (SC).
10
  For each of these components, a score 
larger/smaller than unity indicates an improvement/worsening of the corresponding measure 
and a score equal to 1 indicates no change. The same is true for the overall TFP measure 
resulting from the multiplication of the three scores.  
Equation (1) is usually estimated separately for each time period, and the resulting Malmquist 
index therefore compares year pairs every time independently; this often translates into wide 
oscillations, as shifts of the frontier induced by random shocks are confused with changes in 
 10 
technology. We avoid this problem by estimating (1) and (2) sequentially (Tulken and 
Vanden Eeckaut, 1995). This means that the estimation of (1) (and therefore subsequently of 
(2)) is conducted each time including not only the current year but also all the years 
preceding it, which is equivalent to assuming that technological knowledge accumulates over 
time.
11
 The sequential estimation has also the additional advantage of reducing the well 
known dimensionality problem of DEA
12
, and it also enhances the comparability with SFA 
that uses time trends to model technological change (O’ Donnell et al, 2008).  
The stochastic frontier model is an econometric method that consists of a (cost or production 
or profit) function with a composite error term, made up of two separate, although jointly 
estimated, components: stochastic noise and inefficiency (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and 
Van den Broek, 1977). In this paper we estimate a stochastic translog cost frontier with non 
constant inefficiency whose mean depends upon a set of covariates (Battese and Coelli 
1995)
13
. We choose a translog functional form so our model is  
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Where vit~N(0, σ
2
) is noise and itu ~N
+(δ’Zit, 
2
u ) is inefficiency, modelled as  
 itit RTTTu   3210                    (4) 
With εit ~N(0,
2
 ) truncated at the variable point itZ'  to allow for the non-negativity 
constraint on uit, so that εit ≥ itZ' .   
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In (3) itC  is the observed total operating cost of bank i at time t, and it depends on inputs 
prices w and outputs y. R is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for the period following re-
regulation (1998-2009) and T is time; together with their interaction with inputs and outputs 
they model (neutral and non neutral) technical change and changes in technology following 
re-regulation. The exogenous environmental variables that we described in the data section 
are in the vector E.
 
Equation (4) models inefficiency as a function of time and re-regulation, as the relevance of 
the difference between ownerships is already captured by the estimation of separate 
frontiers
14
. Equations (3) and (4) are estimated simultaneously by Maximum Likelihood.  
Following the procedure outlined in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) we define and calculate 
the Divisia index of TFP change for each of the k ownerships as 
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The index therefore is computed as the sum of six components, a positive net value in each of 
which translates into a positive growth in TFP, to be interpreted as follows. The first 
component measures the scale effect (SC
k
). The second component represents technological 
progress, measured as shifts of the frontier due to the passing of time (TC
k
). The third 
component measures the impact on TFP of all the environmental variables in (3) (EX
k
). The 
fourth term is a measure of allocative inefficiency, specified as a deviation of the observed 
inputs cost shares from their optimal ones (ALLC
k
). The fifth component measures the 
change in cost efficiency (EC
k
) and finally the last is the so-called mark-up effect (MU
k
), 
representing departures from marginal cost pricing and/or from an equi-proportionate mark-
up for every output (Denny et al., 1981; Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005). 
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To compute equation (5) for the ownership specific cases we use the parameters estimates of 
equations (3) and (4).  
 
C. The estimation of metafrontiers 
When firms in different groups (countries, industry, ownership types etc.) face different 
technologies their (production or cost functions and) frontiers have to be estimated 
separately, precluding the possibility of comparisons among them. More formally, if there are 
k different technology sets in an input perspective at every time t there will be k different 
input sets each defined as  
 feasibleisXYXL ktktktkt ),(:  
The idea behind the metafrontier is that all L
k
t sets belong to a common unrestricted 
technology set L*t: 
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to which each of the k groups has potential access. 
The metafrontier is defined as the boundary of this unrestricted technology set and it is 
derived as the envelope of the group frontiers, identifying a metatechnology that is assumed 
to be available to all the firms in the sample. 
In SFA the metafrontier is estimated by linear or quadratic programming (Battese 2004) as an 
overarching function that envelops the single group frontiers. Define 
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as the k-th group cost frontier, depending on the matrix of independent variables X and a 
vector of group specific parameters βk. The metafrontier can be defined as the envelope of the 
k estimations of (6) as 
*)exp(*)(*  ititit XXfC         (7) 
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So it has the same functional form of (6) with a vector of parameters β* that has to be 
estimated subject to the constraint that 
Xitβ* ≤Xitβ
k
         (8) 
That is the meta cost technology gives the minimum possible cost available among all the 
groups. 
Equation (7) can be estimated by linear programming, hence solving 
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subject to (8).
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 The radial distance of each unit from the metafrontier is called metaefficiency 
and it is defined as 
k
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which given (6) is equivalent to
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Equation (11) means that the metaefficiency of firm i of group k at time t is made of two 
parts: the first is its group specific cost efficiency )exp( kit
k
it uEFF  , with 10 
k
itEFF . The 
second is known as technological gap ratio (TGR), and it measures the distance between the 
metafrontier and the group specific frontier; TGR ≤1 with higher values indicating a closer 
proximity to the metafrontier and lower values indicating a larger gap between the two. 
Empirically one would first estimate EFF
k
 and TGR and compute EFF* subsequently as their 
product.
  
 14 
In DEA, which is already a linear programming technique, the estimation of a metafrontier is 
the estimation of a general unrestricted frontier using all the group data together. Similarly to 
SFA also in DEA we will have 
k
it
it
it
EFF
EFF
TGR
*
 . 
Coming finally to the calculation of TFP change, this has to be based upon the metafrontier 
results. For the Divisia index we perform the calculations in (5) using the estimated 
coefficients from the metafrontier obtained from (9) and (8). Given the specification of (10) 
and to avoid double counting of technological progress the cost efficiency measure used in 
the Divisia has to remain the group-specific cost efficiency.
 
 
The metafrontier Malmquist index is computed as in (2) but using the metatechnology as a 
reference point so that  
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V. Empirical results 
To test whether the various ownership types are operating under the same technology and 
therefore the data can be pooled under a single frontier, we used both parametric and non-
parametric techniques: t-test, Mann-Whitney, Kruskall-Wallis (KW) test and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test for DEA, as well as an LR test in SFA (Aly et al., 1990;  Elyasiani and 
Mehdian, 1990; Isik and Hassan, 2002). The results are reported in Table A1 in the appendix 
and show that the null hypothesis of a common technology is generally rejected, leading us to 
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conclude that it is appropriate to construct cost efficiency frontiers separately for each 
ownership group.  
 
A. Ownership specific analysis of Total Factor Productivity 
The first part of the analysis therefore consists of estimating ownership-specific frontiers and 
their TFP changes and components. For the parametric analysis, we follow Battese and Coelli 
(1995) and estimate equations (3) and (4) simultaneously with a Maximum Likelihood one-
step procedure. Linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices and Young’s symmetry are 
imposed prior to estimation. In the non-parametric analysis, we follow a sequential Data 
Envelopment Analysis approach (Tulken and Vanden Eeckaut, 1995). This particular 
approach assumes that technical knowledge accumulates over time hence implying 
dependence in the production process; this reduces the wide oscillations typical of DEA as 
the frontier will be moving forward in the presence of technical progress and remain static 
otherwise. The use of sequential DEA should improve the comparability of the two 
methodologies. Nonetheless, due to the fundamental characteristics of the two approaches, 
we would expect the DEA results to be more extreme and, in the presence of technological 
progress, to show larger technology changes than efficiency changes.  
The most important things to notice about this initial part of the analysis are that the SFA 
coefficients and elasticities have the expected signs, inefficiency is significant for all 
ownerships, whilst the passing of time and the introduction of re-regulation have mixed 
effects on the technological choices of the three ownerships.
16
 Furthermore, foreign banks 
show an increase in the optimal scale of production of performing loans and a decrease in that 
of other earning assets, contrary to both private and state banks. This is consistent with the 
removal of restrictions on their operations, which progressively allowed foreign banks to 
increasingly familiarise themselves with the local loans market. As illustrated in Table 3, 
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both SFA and DEA show high average levels of efficiency (about 90%) that slightly worsen 
after re-regulation; these results are not significantly different between the two 
methodologies, with the exception of private banks which DEA ranks as remarkably less 
efficient than SFA.
17
 
<Insert Table 3> 
Moving on to the measurement of productivity, as we can see in Table 4 TFP overall is 
increasing over time, and the difference between the DEA Malmquist and the SFA Divisia is 
not statistically significant; the only difference between the two methodologies is in the 
estimates of technology change, but the general trends and the actual change rates of TFP are 
not statistically different.
18
 This improvement is mainly due to improvements in technology, 
with DEA recording as expected higher values than SFA.  
<Insert Table 4> 
These ownership-specific results do now allow us to draw any inference at the industry level. 
Therefore, to compare results across ownership groups we move on to compute estimates 
relative to a metafrontier.  
 
B.  Metafrontier analysis of Total Factor Productivity 
We estimate metafrontiers using both DEA and SFA techniques, followed by a generalised 
sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a metafrontier Divisia index. To allow a more 
flexible modelling of the passing of time on technology in SFA we estimate two separate 
metafrontiers, one for 1992-1997 and one for the 1998-2009.
19
 
The coefficients of the two SFA-based metafrontiers are reported in Table A3 in the 
appendix. Tables 5 and 6 report the metafrontier Divisia index results and the metafrontier 
Malmquist index results derived from SFA and DEA respectively. 
<Insert Table 5 and 6> 
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The results are very consistent across methodologies, all the comparable series are not 
significantly different at a 5% level (except from scale changes) and find an increase in 
overall TFP especially after 1998. If we do not take into account the environmental factors in 
the Divisia index the figures are even closer (refer to column TFP2 in Table 5), with an 
overall average yearly improvement between 0.4% and 1.4% before 1998 and increasing to 
about 3% per year afterwards. The main contributor to these TFP changes is always 
technological progress. As expected, in DEA this is more marked and translates into a 
worsening of efficiency, whereas SFA gives lower technical improvements and marginally 
positive efficiency changes. Finally, the scale component worsens in all cases, going from 
mildly increasing returns to scale pre-1997 to mildly decreasing returns to scale post 1998. 
 
C.  Metaefficiency and Technology Gap Ratios 
The metafrontier framework allows us to decompose differences in overall performance 
(metaefficiency) into cost efficiency and technology gap ratio (TGR), where the TGR 
measures the distance between the group frontiers and the metafrontier.
20
 While cost 
efficiency relates mainly to the performance of a firm's management, the TGR represents the 
nature of the production environment (O'Donnell et al., 2008). In this context, regulatory 
changes influence the environmental characteristics of the market; therefore an analysis of 
technology gaps can provide important information on the outcomes of the deregulation 
process.  
Table 7 reports the average technology gap ratios (TGR), cost efficiency and metaefficiency 
scores for the whole industry and the different ownerships, for DEA and SFA. Table 7 shows 
that industry technology improves over time, as indicated by the widening gap between the 
metafrontier and the single ownership frontiers (the decreasing TGR values).
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 In particular, 
while before 1998 state banks are the sector leaders in terms of technology and 
 18 
metaefficiency, after 1998 they lose technological leadership in favour of foreign banks. This 
is true for both DEA and SFA. 
<Insert Table 7> 
This improvement in the position of foreign banks is confirmed when we look at individual 
data points and calculate the number and sample proportion of technology leaders for each 
ownership. In this context, we define technology leaders or innovators those banks with a 
TGR =1, i.e. those which are using the best available technology. This is shown in Table 8 
where again we can see the increasingly dominant position of foreign banks after 1998.
22
  
<Insert Table 8> 
 
To corroborate these results, in Figures 1 and 2 we present the histograms and kernel density 
estimations of technology gap ratios for the three ownership types, separately for the periods 
1992-1997 and 1998-2009. 
<Insert Figures 1 and 2> 
The figures quite clearly show how the TGR distribution changes after 1998, with state banks 
in particular losing their lead position whilst the concentration of leaders for foreign banks 
becomes higher than for the rest of the sample.  
 
D. Catch up Index 
Whilst very informative, the TGR is a static measure of leadership. To look further into the 
issue of technological leadership we follow Chen and Yang (2011) and construct a catch-up 
index, given by the ratio of the technical change of the i-th bank against the metafrontier  
(
*
itTC )  to its technical change against the k-th ownership frontier (
k
itTC ), that is: 
k
it
it
it
TC
TC
CU
*

                                                                                               
(13) 
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CU therefore measures the dynamics of the changes in technological leadership among 
different ownership types, with lower values indicating a speeding of the catch up process 
and viceversa. The results are reported in Table 9; they are not significantly different between 
DEA and SFA and indicate that the best practices among foreign banks are narrowing their 
technical gap at a faster speed than state or private banks. The speed of the catch up process 
decreases over time for all ownership types. State banks appear to be the slowest in the 
sample in terms of catching up with the best available technology.  
The overall picture therefore seems to indicate that the change in regulatory regime generated 
a very favourable environment for the best practices of foreign banks to use the best available 
technology and engage in cost technology innovation.   
<Insert Table 9> 
D. Further robustness and convergence test 
Finally, to check on the robustness of the above conclusion we test for the convergence of the 
ownership specific frontiers towards the metafrontier, based on a reduced form of their 
respective dynamic processes (see for example Thirtle et al., 2003). Define 
k
tTC   the change 
of technology of the k-th ownership frontier at time t, 
*
tTC  the change of technology of the 
metafrontier at time t, and assume that the growth processes are given by: 
t
k
tk
t
t
k
k
t TC
TC
TC
TC  




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(14) 
 
and 
ttt TCTC   1*ln**ln                                                                                    
(15) 
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where γk  and γ* are the asymptotic growth rates of 
kTC  and *TC  respectively and λ 
measures the speed of catch up between them. Combining (14) and (15) we get: 
t
t
k
t
k
t
k
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We estimate (16) for each of the ownership types, using both DEA and SFA results, and 
conduct an ADF test to check for the presence of a unit root; namely the presence of a unit 
root (λ = 0) implies that there is no technological spill-over between the metafrontier  and the 
ownership specific frontiers. Conversely the difference between them will be stationary if the 
null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected and λ > 0, with full convergence found if also the 
intercept (γk-γ*) is not significantly different from 0.  
The results of the tests are reported in Table 10 and indicate that only the frontier of foreign 
banks converges consistently across methodologies towards the metafrontier in the long run. 
This confirms our conclusion that the metafrontier is led by foreign banks and suggests a lack 
of significant technological spillovers between ownerships.  
<Insert Table 10> 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The main aim of this study is to assess the impact of regulatory reform on TFP growth and its 
sources and on the ownership-performance relationship for the case of Indian banks. We do 
so by implementing a novel methodological framework which leads to the estimation of TFP 
by means of a non-parametric sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a parametric 
metafrontier Divisia index. 
Guided by two Narasimham Committee reports (in 1991 and 1998 respectively), the Indian 
Government introduced a series of financial sector reforms which fostered a uniform 
regulatory framework, theoretically creating a market with a level playing field. Despite the 
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fact that nearly two decades have passed since the first Narasimham Committee report, we 
find evidence of continued heterogeneity across the industry. Departing from the existing 
literature on efficiency and productivity measurement, we explicitly tested and rejected the 
assumption of the existence of a common production technology, leading us to construct cost 
efficiency frontiers separately for each ownership type. Both DEA and SFA results indicate 
relatively high levels of efficiency, which worsen after 1998. Results are consistent across 
methodologies for state-owned and foreign banks. Private banks are however a very 
heterogeneous group; they experience the largest number of entries (particularly post 1996) 
as well as exits or M&As.  Research shows that the performance of firms entering the market 
is normally below that of the average incumbent. When new small firms enter and exit the 
market, the variance of the distribution is likely to increase and this can explain the lower 
efficiency of private banks measured by DEA compared to SFA. Overall productivity, 
measured both by the DEA Malmquist and the SFA Divisia, is increasing over time. 
Consistently with previous literature, we find that this improvement is mainly due to 
improvements in technology.  
To be able to compare the results across ownership types, we estimate a generalised 
sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a metafrontier Divisia index. Again, the overall 
TFP is positive and mainly driven by technological progress. Results also indicate that 
different ownership types reacted differently to changes in policy and to the operating 
environment. In particular, changes in regulatory regime generated a very favourable 
environment for foreign banks, which enabled them to use the best available technology in 
the industry and engage in cost technology innovation. The position of foreign banks 
becomes increasingly dominant over time and their production technology is becoming the 
best available technology in the industry. This is consistent with the removal of restrictions 
on their operations, which progressively allowed foreign banks to increasingly familiarise 
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themselves with the local loans market. Foreign banks seem to have capitalised on the 
relative advantages of their asset portfolio. On the other hand, the increasing technological 
gap between the best practice and the private and state banks frontier indicates a lack of 
significant technological spillovers. To conclude, financial reforms have benefited the Indian 
banking sector and resulted in sustained productivity growth. However, the benefits of 
reforms have not being uniformly distributed across ownership types, with state-owned banks 
losing the ability to act as undisputed industry leaders as well as losing customers and market 
share. An interesting extension to the current study would be a micro level analysis of the 
characteristics and determinants of ownership differences, with particular focus on bank risk. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Summary of parametric and nonparametric tests for the null hypothesis of a 
common technology among different ownership groups.  
 State vs. Private Foreign vs. Private Foreign vs. State 
T-test (equality of means) 
1992-1997 0.0000 0.0000 0.8217 
1998-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0561 
1992-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0769 
Mann-Whitney test (equality of medians) 
1992-1997 0.0000 0.0000 0.2145 
1998-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.1321 
1992-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0476 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (equality of distributions) 
1992-1997 0.000 0.000 0.018 
1998-2009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1992-2009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kruskall-Wallis test (equality of distributions) 
1992-1997 0.0000 0.0000 0.2145 
1998-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.1321 
1992-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0476 
Likelihood Ratio test (of parameter stability across ownerships) 
1992-2009 
 
0.0000 
(LR statistic = 386.8164) 
Note: the figures are the p-values associated with each test. 
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Table A2: Key results from the estimation of the group specific SFA frontiers 
 STATE FOREIGN PRIVATE 
Elasticities 
92-97 
   
Y1 0.466 0.533 0.509 
Y2 0.500 0.446 0.439 
Y3 0.028 0.015 0.028 
W1 0.686 0.751 0.690 
W2 0.314 0.249 0.310 
Elasticities 
98-09 
   
Y1 0.587 0.491 0.531 
Y2 0.423 0.474 0.429 
Y3 0.053 0.043 0.002 
W1 0.662 0.668 0.721 
W2 0.338 0.332 0.279 
    
T -0.003 0.100** 0.026** 
TT -0.001 -0.0002 0.0002 
Br 0.000** 0.002*** 0.000 
R -0.839*** 0.046 0.069** 
CRR 0.003** -0.004 -0.0004 
SLR 0.004** 0.0013 0.0012 
Mac 0.093 0.413** 0.112* 
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Inefficiency    
Const 0.057** - 0.00 
R 0.167* - 0.066 
T 0.016 - -0.005 
TT -0.002*** - -0.001 
O/n - - -0.183 
O/nR - - 0.100 
Loglk 895.217 198.139 680.998 
Sigmasq 0.003 0.029 0.018 
Gamma 0.828*** 0.8733*** 0.926*** 
O/n is a dummy taking value 1 for “old” private banks who were in business prior to 1995, 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Table A3: Results from the estimation of the SFA Metafrontier  
 1992-1997 1998-2009 
Const 4.373 9.448 
lnY1 -0.142 -0.779 
lnY2 0.848 1.099 
lnY3 -0.009 -0.078 
lnP* 0.312 0.023 
lnY1lnY1 0.049 0.021 
lnY2lnY2 0.014 -0.046 
lnY3lnY3 -0.004 -0.005 
lnP*lnP* 0.123 0.202 
lnY1lnY2 -0.057 0.040 
lnY1lnY3 0.005 0.000 
lnY2lnY3 0.002 0.013 
lnY1lnP* 0.016 0.104 
lnY2lnP* -0.031 -0.079 
lnY3lnP* 0.027 -0.008 
T -0.108 -0.076 
TT -0.002 0.003 
lnY1T -0.024 -0.008 
lnY2T 0.039 0.014 
lnY3T -0.011 -0.007 
lnP*T 0.003 -0.014 
Br 0.00001 0.00001 
CRR 0.003 -0.014 
 27 
SLR 0.003 -0.049 
Mac 0.256 0.28 
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Table 1: Number of banks relative weight of different ownerships 
 
 Number of banks Proportion of total assets 
 State Foreign Private Industry State Foreign Private 
1992 27 13 23 0.986 0.89 0.07 0.04 
1998 27 15 32 0.988 0.82 0.08 0.10 
2009 27 13 22 0.994 0.72 0.08 0.20 
Note: The column industry reports the proportion of total assets of our sample over the whole 
industry. 
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Table 2: Inputs and outputs summary statistics (1992-2009)
 
 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
TC 10261 4182 12.67 250381 21005 
y1 66129 20522 48.48 2277632 151871 
y2 45929 16333 31.98 1179795 98846 
y3 2000 775 0.621 54257 4402 
w1 0.073 0.068 0.004 0.812 0.069 
w2 0.027 0.025 0.002 0.281 0.023 
Note: TC= total operating cost; y1: performing loans; y2: other earning assets; y3: fee-based 
income; w1: loanable funds price; w2 = non-operating cost price. Cost and outputs are in Rs 
mil and deflated using 1994 as the base year. 
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Table 3: Yearly average efficiency scores  
 STATE FOREIGN PRIVATE 
 SFA DEA SFA DEA SFA DEA 
1992-1997 0.923 0.910 0.888 0.906 0.945 0.692 
1998-2009 0.922 0.891 0.884 0.866 0.945 0.628 
1992-2009 0.922 0.897 0.885 0.880 0.945 0.649 
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Table 4: Total Factor Productivity Change 
 TFP
k 
TC
k 
EC
k 
SC
k
 
 Divisia Malmq Divisia Malmq Divisia Malmq Divisia Malmq 
STATE         
92-09 0.999 1.021 1.003 1.051 1.001 0.985 0.995 0.993 
92-97 0.998 1.012 1.01 1.041 1.000 0.980 1.00 0.985 
98-09 0.999 1.025 1.001 1.055 1.002 0.987 0.993 0.988 
FOREIGN         
92-09 1.071 1.048 1.051 1.116 1.002 0.985 0.999 0.956 
92-97 1.070 1.045 1.049 1.132 1.003 0.973 1.002 0.958 
98-09 1.071 1.049 1.052 1.110 1.001 0.989 0.997 0.955 
PRIVATE         
92-09 1.024 1.029 1.015 1.095 1.001 0.972 1.005 0.965 
92-97 1.029 1.074 1.013 1.165 0.998 0.968 1.005 0.957 
98-09 1.022 1.011 1.016 1.067 1.002 0.974 1.005 0.969 
Note: The superscript k indicates results obtained with reference to group specific frontiers. 
TFP = total factor productivity; TC = technical change; EC = efficiency change; SC= scale 
change. Along with TFP the table reports only the 3 components of the Divisia index directly 
comparable with the Malmquist index: technical change, efficiency change and scale change. 
The Divisia values have been transformed from change rates into changes to make the 
comparison with the Malmquist possible. 
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Table 5: Metafrontier Divisia Index 
 SC* TC*  EX* ALLC* EC* MU* TFP* TFP2 
92-93 0.998 1.008 0.968 1.007 0.985 1.001 0.967 0.999 
93-94 0.995 1.006 1.021 1.000 1.008 0.982 1.012 0.991 
94-95 0.994 1.008 0.955 1.001 1.010 1.012 0.980 1.024 
95-96 0.992 1.018 0.969 0.993 0.990 1.028 0.990 1.021 
96-97 0.984 1.021 1.016 1.001 1.006 0.973 1.000 0.985 
98-99 0.992 1.077 0.982 1.002 1.001 0.991 1.044 1.062 
99-00 0.987 1.070 0.966 1.000 1.015 1.012 1.049 1.083 
00-01 0.992 1.064 0.968 1.003 1.008 0.975 1.009 1.041 
01-02 0.992 1.059 0.954 0.998 0.996 1.043 1.042 1.087 
02-03 0.994 1.053 0.979 0.986 1.027 1.012 1.050 1.071 
03-04 0.990 1.046 0.990 0.976 1.007 1.006 1.015 1.025 
04-05 0.988 1.037 0.965 0.986 1.016 0.902 0.894 0.929 
05-06 0.984 1.032 0.956 1.001 1.007 0.987 0.966 1.010 
06-07 0.991 1.028 0.998 1.021 0.993 0.989 1.020 1.022 
07-08 0.965 1.027 0.955 1.024 1.008 1.001 0.979 1.024 
08-09 0.985 1.024 0.987 1.001 1.005 1.002 1.004 1.018 
92-09 0.989 1.036 0.977 1.000 1.005 0.994 1.001 1.024 
92-97 0.993 1.012 0.985 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.990 1.004 
98-09 0.987 1.047 0.973 1.000 1.007 0.992 1.006 1.033 
Note: The superscript * indicates results obtained with reference to the metafrontier. As in (5) 
the TFP change rate of the Divisia index is  given by the sum of scale effect (SC), technical 
change (TC), the effects of environmental variables (EX), allocative efficiency (ALLC), cost 
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efficiency (EC) and the mark-up effect (MU). TFP2 reports overall TFP without taking into 
account the environmental factors not accounted for in the Malmquist index.  
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Table 6: Metafrontier Malmquist Index 
 SC* TC*  EC*  TFP* 
92-93 0.968 1.028 0.946 0.963 
93-94 0.969 1.116 1.041 1.126 
94-95 0.958 1.066 0.965 1.018 
95-96 1.007 1.029 0.917 0.975 
96-97 0.949 1.022 1.012 0.996 
97-98 0.983 1.067 1.036 1.109 
98-99 0.909 1.064 0.902 0.859 
99-00 0.958 1.112 1.109 1.178 
00-01 0.929 1.067 0.935 0.914 
01-02 1.003 1.401 1.132 1.356 
02-03 0.957 1.164 1.008 1.065 
03-04 0.924 1.256 0.998 1.132 
04-05 0.927 1.030 0.825 0.765 
05-06 0.949 1.007 0.973 0.986 
06-07 0.998 1.009 0.942 1.054 
07-08 1.010 1.050 0.977 1.131 
08-09 0.978 1.022 0.977 1.016 
92-09 0.963 1.085 0.979 1.030 
92-97 0.970 1.052 0.975 1.014 
98-09 0.960 1.099 0.981 1.036 
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Note: The superscript * indicates results obtained with reference to group the metafrontier. 
TFP = total factor productivity; TC = technical change; EC = efficiency change; SC= scale 
change. 
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Table 7: Technological Gap Ratio, Cost Efficiency and Metaefficiency 
DEA  1992-1997 1998-2009 1992-2009 
TGR State 0.862 0.740 0.781 
 Foreign 0.810 0.810 0.810 
 Private 0.706 0.764 0.745 
 All 0.793 0.771 0.779 
     
EFF
k
 State 0.910 0.892 0.898 
 Foreign 0.908 0.868 0.881 
 Private 0.697 0.622 0.647 
 All 0.827 0.777 0.794 
     
EFF* State 0.784 0.657 0.699 
 Foreign 0.735 0.702 0.713 
 Private 0.491 0.475 0.480 
 All 0.670 0.611 0.631 
SFA     
TGR State 0.949 0.826 0.867 
 Foreign 0.935 0.828 0.864 
 Private 0.891 0.765 0.806 
 All 0.924 0.802 0.842 
     
EFF
k
 State 0.923 0.922 0.922 
 Foreign 0.888 0.884 0.885 
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 Private 0.945 0.944 0.945 
 All 0.924 0.923 0.923 
     
EFF* State 0.876 0.760 0.798 
 Foreign 0.830 0.732 0.765 
 Private 0.842 0.722 0.761 
 All 0.853 0.739 0.777 
Note: The superscript k indicates results obtained with reference to group specific frontiers; * 
indicates results obtained with reference to group specific frontiers. TGR = Technological 
Gap Ratio; EFF
k
= cost efficiency; EFF* = metaefficiency. 
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Table 8: Number and proportion of technology leaders per ownership category 
 SFA DEA 
 1992-1997 1998-2009 1992-1997 1998-2009 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Foreign 11 34 12 48 10 19 40 38 
Private 9 28 7 28 9 17 30 29 
State 12 38 6 24 34 64 34 33 
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Table 9: catch-up index pre and post 1998 per ownership group. 
  SFA DEA 
 S F P S F P 
92-97 0.990 0.976 1.007 1.019 0.928 0.905 
98-09 1.047 0.996 1.030 1.082 0.968 1.004 
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Table 10: ADF test of convergence of (12) 
DEA Foreign State Private 
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
(γk-γ*) 0.013 0.410 -0.044 0.327 0.000 0.985 
λ 0.764 0.021 0.814 0.290 0.461 0.378 
SFA       
(γk-γ*) 0.003 0.190 -0.001 0.177 -0.001 0.505 
λ 0.233 0.06 0.108 0.025 0.106 0.442 
Note: This is an ADF test with one lagged difference term. We report directly the value of λ 
and its p-value is the MacKinnon p-value. 
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Figure 1: TGR distribution from SFA pre and post 1998 per ownership group 
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Figure 2: TGR distribution from DEA pre and post 1998 per ownership group 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1
 The positive impact of financial reforms on the technology of production is typically based 
on two arguments. First, the overall cost of producing at a given level of output is reduced by 
declining compliance costs. Second, regulatory reforms usually reduce restrictions on 
activities, thereby offering the opportunity for banks to take advantage of economies of scale 
and scope. Efficiency improvements are expected to arise from the increased competitive 
pressures that reduce managerial inefficiencies. 
2
 For detailed reviews of the impact of financial reforms on the productivity change of 
banking systems see for example Mukherjee et al, (2001), and Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003).  
3
 Deregulation seems to increase efficiency for all banks but does not result in inter-
ownership convergence (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy, 2005); different ownerships react 
with different speeds to the change of regulatory environment (Isik and Hassan, 2003; 
Leightner and Lovell, 1998); ownership structure becomes neutral in terms of productivity 
growth and a diverse ownership structure also functions as a stimulus to market competition 
(Sturm and Williams, 2004). A detailed literature review on this issue can be found in Sturm 
and Williams (2004).  
4
 Structural deregulation was characterised by the removal of entry restrictions to private 
ownership, liberalization of interest rates on deposits and lending, and an increase in the 
range of permitted activities. Prudential norms related to assets classification, income 
recognition, provisioning, risk-based capital adequacy and informational disclosure.  
5
 See Cole (2009) for a discussion of the relevance of bank ownership and economic growth. 
6
 For a review of early literature see Berger and Humphrey (1997), and Goddard et al (2001). 
Reviews of more recent literature are presented, among others, by Berger (2007); Goddard et 
al (2007), Cook and Seiford (2009); Hughes and Mester (2010). 
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7
 Performing loans are measured as the difference between total loans and non-performing 
loans. Other earning assets aggregate government securities, other approved securities, 
shares, debentures and bonds, subsidiaries and joint ventures and other investment outside 
India (i.e. total investment).  
8
 According to the accounting practice followed by the Indian banking sector post-1992, 
income accrual would cease once the loan is recognized as non-performing. Therefore, the 
interest received on loans recorded in the loss and profit account is associated with the 
performing loans. 
9
  For a general review of the methodological approaches to efficiency and productivity 
measurement see for instance Fried et al. (2008).  
10
 The subscripts c and v refer to whether the distance function is with respect to a constant 
returns to scale frontier or a variable returns to scale frontier. 
11
 The estimation of a sequential frontier changes the superscript in Equation (1) from t to all 
the periods up to time t, i.e. 1,2,3,….t. The technical details can be found in Tulken and 
Vanden Eeckaut (1995) and Thirtle et al. (2003). 
12
 This is essentially like a problem of degrees of freedom, leading to excessive estimates of 
efficiency when the number of variables is too high relative to the number of observations. 
13
 We did not introduce fixed effects into the model as most of the heterogeneity seemed 
handled satisfactorily by the chosen variables and the separation of the ownership frontiers, 
as usefully suggested by an anonymous referee. Indeed as noted by Zhou (2001) a fixed 
effects estimation uses within-groups variation; since many of the regressors change only 
gradually over time this can potentially lead to over control and an overshadowing of the 
cross sectional relationship. 
14
 As we will see this choice is based on a test of whether the data can be pooled. 
15
 In (9) the hat notation indicates the estimator of the corresponding parameter. 
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16
 Given the focus of the paper and for reasons of space we do not provide a detailed 
discussion of the ownership-specific frontiers. The main results of their estimation are 
reported in Table A2 in the appendix. 
17Private banks are the most heterogeneous group in the sample, hence the more “noisy” as 
they experience the largest number of entries and exits, mergers and acquisitions and show 
significant differences also depending on whether they are “old” or “new”, as confirmed by 
the stochastic cost frontier results. The presence of all this noise cannot be accounted for by 
DEA which therefore ranks any of the bad performers much worse than SFA does. 
18
 To make the comparison possible we transformed the TFP growth rate of the Divisia index 
into a TFP growth as the Malmquist. 
19
 We also estimated a single metafrontier for the whole time period. The results were 
unsatisfactory and therefore are not reported. 
20
 As discussed in the methodology section, TGR is computed as the ratio of metaefficiency 
to cost efficiency. 
21
 Recall that increases in the technological gap ratios imply decreases in the gap between the 
group frontier and the metafrontier. The higher the ratio, the closer the group frontier is to the 
metafrontier (i.e. best available technology) and vice versa. 
22
 The notable difference in the absolute number of technology leaders between the two 
methodologies is explained by their deterministic vs stochastic nature. Indeed if we were to 
lower the threshold even just to 99% for SFA the results would be remarkably closer.   
